What a Ski-Tracking App's Nine-Year Climb to $1M ARR Teaches Indie Developers
Slopes did not arrive as a polished business. It began in 2013 as a side project, earned roughly $10,600 across its first two years, and took about nine years to reach seven-figure annual recurring revenue. The path matters more than the headline: a niche audience, a late subscription switch, a marketing hire pulled from the user base, and an unusual commitment to showing revenue charts with their axes intact.
A slow start inside a small, talkative niche
Curtis Herbert launched Slopes in 2013 into a market that already had a handful of ski-tracking apps — a useful signal that demand existed. The launch itself was quiet. Like many independent developers, Curtis had not built a marketing plan, and a write-up from tech journalist Peter Cohen about a year later showed how narrow the press overlap was. As he put it, not many Apple writers ski, so a general tech publication could reasonably decide that only a sliver of its readers would care.
The compensation came from the community itself. Skiers who go often, not just holiday visitors, are a tight and chatty group. Early growth arrived through word-of-mouth referrals, with Curtis crediting a mix of that network effect and plain luck. The lesson for a niche app is not that press is worthless, but that a small, engaged audience can carry a product further than a broad audience with weak overlap.
Why subscriptions arrived two years in — and why monthly didn't last
About two years after launch, Curtis decided to run Slopes as a real business with recurring revenue. That timing was early: it came roughly a year before Apple began actively encouraging broader subscription use on the App Store. Yearly subscriptions were then uncommon outside dating apps and fitness services such as Strava, but Curtis's principle was to charge for the value delivered and charge for it annually. The ski industry gave him a familiar frame — people already buy season passes, so a season pass inside Slopes made intuitive sense.
Seasonality then exposed a flaw. Where users could not ski year-round, a card statement showing a winter-sport charge in a snowless month triggered cancellations. Dropping the monthly option and switching to consumable in-app purchase passes addressed that mismatch. The decision rule worth borrowing: match the billing cadence to when the customer actually receives value, not to the cadence that is easiest to administer.
Marketing that followed the audience instead of the ad auction
Slopes had little marketing strategy at first. About three years in, Curtis spent $5,000 on Instagram ads and recovered only a small percentage of that year's downloads. Rather than scale a channel that was not paying back, he invested in making sharing easier: the app generated shareable cards with run stats and highlights that users could post to social media. He described the approach as avoiding growth hacks and chart-climbing ad dumps.
The first full-time hire was a marketer, which is unusual for an indie app. It happened organically. Ella was a Slopes user who emailed about a bug she had found. The conversation continued, and Ella, who had a growth and marketing background, proposed a part-time role that eventually became full-time. She was already invested in the space, and she took on the work Curtis knew he should do but never made time for. Her contribution went beyond campaigns: she pushed deeper into customer segmentation, active-user analysis, and churn, which gave Curtis better evidence for deciding which features to build.
Email, feedback loops, and a human voice
Ella also introduced NPS surveys, which became a product-development input rather than a vanity metric. When scores dipped around something like an Apple Watch problem, the team could see it and fix it, then watch the score recover.
Email carried much of the marketing load, borrowing a page from SaaS. On another developer's recommendation, Curtis adopted Vero, which let him build workflows that send messages in response to subscription lifecycle events. He reported strong conversions and positive replies to pro-tip style messages. The tone was deliberately personal, so users felt welcomed rather than addressed by a faceless corporation. A practical field map helps separate the jobs: lifecycle email handles timing-based outreach around subscription events; NPS surveys capture sentiment and surface defects; shareable run cards turn satisfied users into distribution.
Reading revenue charts honestly
Curtis's commitment to building in public comes from frustration. Independent developers rarely get a clear picture of what to expect, and even published information is often incomplete. A common offender is a revenue or growth chart with no Y-axis, which hides the long tail. He recalled a chart from a well-known Mac software company that showed a large paid-upgrade spike and then a tail — with no way to tell whether that tail was $10, $1,000, or $10,000 a day.
Now that Slopes has passed $1 million in ARR, he accepts that keeping the axis could read as a humblebrag, but his aim is to level-set expectations. He has said he would like to publish a more detailed operating-cost page — around $300,000 per year excluding his own salary — so other indie developers can see what running a seven-figure app actually involves. One reporting distinction matters throughout: the revenue figures are stated before Apple's 15% cut, following the SaaS convention of reporting revenue before processing fees. Profit is a separate conversation.
The Apple Design Award
A few months after his Sub Club podcast interview, Slopes was selected for an Apple Design Award, an honor that recognized 12 best-in-class apps and games. Slopes won in the Interaction category, which celebrates apps that deliver intuitive interfaces and effortless controls tailored to their platform. Apple's citation noted that the app is packed with a mountain of data yet as easy to navigate as a nice green run, and that it demonstrates how thoughtful design can elevate an experience. For a bootstrapped app that began as a side project, that is a notable outcome — and a reminder that design quality can be a durable differentiator even when growth is slow.
| Decision | What prompted it | Observed effect |
|---|---|---|
| Launch with no marketing plan | Small overlap between tech press readers and skiers | Slow word-of-mouth trickle from core ski community |
| Move to yearly subscriptions | Treat the app as a real business | Recurring revenue, but seasonal churn from off-season charges |
| Drop monthly, add consumable passes | Winter-only relevance for many users | Removes the year-round charge mismatch |
| $5,000 Instagram test | Experiment with paid acquisition | Small share of that year's downloads |
| Hire a marketer first | User offered to handle neglected tasks | Deeper segmentation, churn and active-user analysis |
| Send lifecycle emails | Borrowed from SaaS practice | Reported good conversions and positive feedback |
Figures are the founder's own reported numbers from the 2022 interview; treat them as a historical reference, not current performance.
Frequently asked questions
How long did it take Slopes to reach $1M in ARR?
About nine years from its 2013 launch. The first two years brought in roughly $10,600, so the growth curve was long and shallow before it steepened.
Why did the app stop offering a monthly subscription?
Many users only ski part of the year. A recurring monthly charge during snowless months felt mismatched and drove seasonal cancellations, so the founder moved to consumable in-app purchase passes instead.
Did paid advertising drive growth?
Not much. A $5,000 Instagram experiment produced only a small fraction of that year's downloads. The bigger levers were shareable in-app stat cards, word of mouth, and lifecycle email.
What does the revenue figure include?
The reported ARR is measured before Apple's 15% cut, following the convention of reporting revenue before processing fees. Profit is a separate number.